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Chapter 5: ‘Deliberative democracy and government public relations in a deeply 
divided society: Exploring the perspectives of Government Information Officers in 
Northern Ireland.’ 
Ian Somerville and Charis Rice 
 
Abstract 
Northern Ireland since its establishment after the partition of Ireland in 1921 has been a deeply 
divided society and a region riven by periods of violent conflict, most notably the ‘Troubles’ 
(1968-1998). In recent years a peace process attempted to reconcile the societal divisions and, 
in respect to formal politics, the Good Friday Agreement (1998) produced a new constitutional 
settlement based on consociational governance in Northern Ireland. In Western European states 
some sort of majoritarian democratic system is the norm and thus most studies of government 
public relations (PR) and political communication by Western scholars focuses on majoritarian 
parliamentary or presidential government systems. The role of government communication 
specialists within mandatory coalitions has received little attention from scholars, despite the 
fact that consociationalism is increasingly prescribed as a solution to deeply divided conflict 
ridden societies across the world. Drawing on data from elite interviews this chapter analyses 
perspectives on government PR from Government Information Officers' (GIO) alongside that 
of the other key actors with whom they regularly interact in Northern Ireland’s government-
media communicative sphere - ministerial Special Advisers (SpAds) and political journalists. 
The communicative interactions between these groups are discussed within broader debates 
about government public relations in democratic societies and in particular in relation to 
theoretical work on communication and deliberative democracy. We also assess how the 
comparatively unique consociational political system, designed to produce a functioning 
democratic government in a deeply divided society, impacts on government public relations in 
Northern Ireland’s public sphere. Finally, we conclude with some reflections on the role 
government PR could play in deploying ‘bridging rhetoric’ to help Northern Ireland move 
toward a more authentic deliberative democracy. 
 
Deliberative democracy, public relations and the ‘public sphere’ 
Sanders (2009: 268) notes that studies of ‘government communication can hardly avoid 
discussion of normative issues, nor would it be desirable to do so if our research is to engage 
with issues that matter not only to the wider scientific community but also to policy makers 
and our fellow citizens’. Habermas' public sphere model (1962 [trans. 1989]), with 
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amendments and modifications (Habermas 1984), still serves as a normative vision in much 
political communication (Davis 2009a), media studies (Lunt and Livingston 2013) and PR 
literature (Fairbanks et al., 2007). Although enormously influential, Habermas’ original 
concept was critiqued for several significant failings, notably his ‘account of history’, his 
‘simplistic political analysis’ and ‘his apparent blindness to the many varieties of exclusion 
(based on gender, class, ethnicity, etc.) endemic to the public discussions he so lauded’ (Lunt 
and Livingstone. 2013: 3). Despite revising the notion of the public sphere in important ways 
to take account of these criticisms, it is clear that Habermas remains committed to producing 
a normative democratic theory which stresses transparent government communication as a 
necessary condition to successfully produce rational, informed and deliberative public 
discussion of government policies and actions. We agree that this is an important endeavor 
and concur with Garnham (2007: 203) that the notion of the public sphere remains in many 
ways a useful ‘perspective from which to think about the problem of democracy in the 
modern world’. 
 
However it is important to point out that we do diverge somewhat from a strict Habermasian 
approach in relation to democratic theory. Dryzek  (2000, p. 1) notes that Habermas was 
quick to embrace and identify with the ‘deliberative turn’ in democratic theory which has 
resulted in the idea that ‘the essence of democracy itself is now widely taken to be 
deliberation, as opposed to voting, interest aggregation, constitutional rights, or even self-
government. The deliberative turn represents a renewed concern with the authenticity of 
democracy: the degree to which democratic control is substantive rather than symbolic, and 
engaged by competent citizens’. However it is also clear that ‘deliberation’ for Habermas 
involves imposing narrow limits on democratic discourse which should consist of purely 
rational exchanges; ‘Participants in argumentation have to presuppose in general that the 
structure of their communication…excludes all force…except the force of the better 
argument’ (Habermas, 1984 p. 25). In contrast, Dryzek (2000, p. 2) favours a position which 
would allow ‘rhetoric’, ‘humour’, ‘emotion’, and ‘testimony or storytelling’ as contributions 
to authentic deliberation insisting only on ‘the requirement that communication induce 
reflection upon preferences in a non-coercive fashion.’ Which rules out coercion in the form 
of ‘manipulation’, ‘indoctrination’, ‘propaganda’, ‘deception’, ‘threats’ etc. 
 
While we subscribe to the view that the public sphere concept still ‘serves theorists well as an 
ideal type – that is, as a construct against which different real-world approximations can be 
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evaluated’ (Bennett and Entman 2001: 3) we largely share Dryzek’s view that the 
communicative conditions for deliberative democracy articulated by Habermas and his 
followers are unnecessarily constraining. The public sphere model is a more fruitful paradigm 
for democracy if it is much more expansive in the kinds of communication it allows, while 
still adhering to the important criteria that deliberative discourses must demonstrate that they 
are concerned with the ‘public interest’ and that they are ‘inclusive and reflexive’ (Dryzek, 
2000). These conditions are clearly of key importance in what Dryzek (2000) refers to as 
‘empowered’ deliberative spaces such as legislatures. This point has been highlighted by 
Edwards' (2015) recent work on PR and deliberative democracy which notes that PR is an 
important and legitimate mechanism for the transmission of positions and preferences 
between ‘empowered spaces’  and ‘public spaces’ (including the media). Edwards (2015: 12) 
argues that ‘In the context of deliberative systems, the effect of public relations on the quality 
of deliberation is most logically framed in terms of its effects on deliberative capacity’, that is 
to say the degree to which PR can adhere to the conditions of ‘generalizable interest’ and 
‘genuine engagement’. The growth of public relations in governmental systems is irreversible 
and it has become a crucial ‘part of the infrastructure of modern political communication’ 
(McNair 2007: 337). It is therefore increasingly important to assess and interrogate its role in 
fostering or diminishing deliberative democracy.    
 
Government public relations and the media 
Relationships between the media and political actors are of central importance in 
contemporary democracies. Some scholars note that these relationships are characterised by 
contest and antagonism (see Lee, 1999; Wolfsfeld, 1997) with the media tending to be 
controlled or at least subordinate to powerful institutions who act as “primary definers” of the 
news (Hall, et al., 1978: 57). Some commentators emphasise reciprocity between government 
and media (Negrine, 2008) or note a relationship characterised by exchange and negotiation 
(Ericson, et al., 1989). Gans suggests a symbiotic relationship but notes; “Although it takes 
two to tango … sources do the leading (1979: 116). Others have placed the emphasis more on 
how politics has become ‘mediatized’ in the sense that such is the influence of the mass 
media on political actors and political systems that they have adjusted to the demands of the 
media (Asp, 2002) or indeed that such is the nature of media saturation that political 
institutions are inseparable from it (Lilleker, 2008; Mazzoleni and Shulz, 2008). Gelders et al. 
(2007: 374) argue that political actors rely on the media because: ‘the news media are the 
platform where the government establishes or loses its credibility … the battle for the 
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public’s trust increasingly takes place in the media rather than in the parliament’ (italics in 
original).  
 
Much recent media research has typically argued that the government communication process 
is affected by micro-level interactions between journalists and their government sources (Davis 
2002; Falasca and Nord 2013). Davis (2009b) argues that how communicative power is 
exercised in contemporary societies is best understood through the concept of ‘elite-elite 
relationships’, where government and media elites effectively control and exchange 
information in a closed circuit. At the same time, and related to this point, research has also 
demonstrated a general point about all communications/PR work (Sriramesh and Vercic 2009) 
that relationships between journalists and government communicators may be strongly 
influenced by their immediate political, cultural and economic context (Laursen and Valentini 
2013). 
 
In the UK (and Northern Ireland), two distinct groups of communication professionals 
coexist, Government Information Officers (GIOs) and Ministerial Special Advisers (SpAds) 
who are personally appointed by a departmental minister. The role of the GIO is (at least 
theoretically) designed to be apolitical, in that they assist the government of whichever 
political persuasion in the areas of information management and media relations in an 
impartial civil servant capacity. The SpAd is de facto a temporary civil servant who is 
appointed by a government minister to assist him/her in a political capacity. In recent times 
UK research on government communication has raised concerns about the ‘politicization’ of 
the civil service and concomitantly that the neutral GIO is being undermined or supplanted by 
the partisan SpAd (Gaber, 2004; Negrine, 2008). Fawcett and Gay (2010:49) argue that: ‘It’s 
increasingly difficult (if not impossible) to formally divide the ‘official’ work of civil 
servants from the ‘political’ work of special advisers’.  
 
Some scholars strongly link the rise of public relations work in government to the notion of 
‘spinning’ information for political purposes (Andrews 2006; McNair 2007). According to 
this view government communicators frequently produce: ‘information which, far from being 
rational and motivated by what is in the public interest, is partial, ideologically committed, 
and at times downright dishonest’ (McNair 2007: 97). Gaber (2000) argues that there are 
essentially two categories of government PR efforts, ‘above the line’ communication and 
‘below the line’ tactics or ‘spin’. The ‘above the line’ category includes those activities that 
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would be considered routine, and that ‘would have caused an “old fashioned” civil service 
press officer no great difficulty’ (Gaber 2000, p. 508). These are: producing press releases; 
holding press conferences; using Ministerial speeches and answers to Parliamentary questions 
in the House of Commons to communicate information; and, ‘reacting to breaking news 
events’ (Gaber 2000, p. 509). ‘Below the line’ or ‘spin’ includes those activities which can at 
times be ethically questionable and, Gaber (2000, p. 508) suggests, are ‘usually covert and as 
much about strategy and tactics as about the imparting of information’. Such tactics include; 
‘off the record’ briefings to handpicked journalists to set and drive the news agenda (ensuring 
that government receives coverage on its terms), ‘leaks’ to discredit political rivals inside 
one’s party or opponents outside it, ‘kite flying’ (to test reactions to a policy before a formal 
announcement) and ‘fire breaking’, planting a another story to deflect attention from a 
negative one about the government (Gaber, 2000; Somerville and Ramsey, 2012). Spin at its 
worst can involve blatant lies and manipulation; at its best it still involves various shades of 
political propaganda (Heibert, 2003). 
 
Investigating what it is that government and media actors really do in their everyday 
professional roles is important because it can lead: “…to a necessary demystification on the 
one hand, while at the same time this might allow a first step towards reducing the much 
lamented democratic deficit” (Wodak 2011:25; italics in original). Davis echoes this noting 
that ‘to move critical debates about politics, communication and citizenship into new 
territory… means engaging with “actually existing democracies”, contemporary media 
environments, political actors and political processes’ (2009a: 294). This research responds to 
Davis' call by examining the government-media communicative relationships in Northern 
Ireland’s developing post-conflict democracy.   
  
Post-conflict Northern Ireland: Devolution and consociational governance  
Bloomfield noted between 1969 and 1997, the conflict known as the ‘Troubles’ in Northern 
Ireland claimed 3,585 lives and that over 50,000 people were injured. He pointed out that:  
 
Some 3,600 deaths may not seem too calamitous when compared with the scale of the 
Holocaust, with the local fatalities in the First World War, or with the suffering in 
Bosnia or Rwanda or Cambodia. But all of this has to be considered against the small 
scale of Northern Ireland. If the UK as a whole with its population of some 58 million 
people, had experienced death pro rata, as compared with the 1.6 million population 
of Northern Ireland, there would have been a total of over 130,000 dead (Bloomfield 
1998 p. 3).  
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We can extend this comparison further by noting that the 50,000 injured in Northern Ireland 
during the sectarian conflict is equivalent to 2 million if applied to the UK as a whole or just 
over 10 million if applied to the USA. Making such comparisons are only useful up to a point 
but they do illustrate the impact of the sectarian conflict on many of the citizens of Northern 
Ireland and the fact that recovery from 30 years of political violence is for many a slow and 
painful process (for a detailed account see Hargie and Dickson 2003). Stringer et al (2009 p. 
241) note: ‘As Northern Ireland has moved slowly since the paramilitary ceasefires in 1994 
from a conflict to a post-conflict region, the underlying problems of social segregation and 
political mistrust have left an uneasy peace’. Key reasons for this ‘uneasy peace’ is the fact 
that Northern Ireland remains a highly segregated society in which most people live, learn 
and worship, largely within sectarian groupings. In areas like public housing, 90 per cent is 
segregated along religious lines with the vast majority of Catholics and Protestants living in 
areas that are dominated by their own identity group (Hargie et al., 2015). Only 6.8 per cent 
of children attend integrated schools, with the remainder attending Protestant or Catholic 
schools and therefore have little opportunity to mix outside their ethnic group until they go to 
university or work (Somerville et al., 2011). 
 
A key outcome of the Good Friday Agreement (10th April 1998), which formally brought to 
an end the violent conflict known as The Troubles in Northern Ireland, was the devolution of 
powers to a consociational (i.e. mandatory power-sharing) government. This constitutional 
settlement means that Northern Ireland’s political institutions operate in significantly 
different ways from the majoritarian electoral systems which characterize most Western 
democratic societies. Governance is by a broad based, devolved and power-sharing 
administration, with Executive power shared via party lists on the basis of a complex 
proportional representation mechanism based on the de Hondt system.i Between 1998 and 
2007 Northern Ireland was characterized by breakdowns in relationships between the 
political parties in power, leading to a lack of political progress (Gormley-Heenan and 
Devine, 2010) and difficulties in presenting a centralized and unified position on policy 
(Fawcett, 2002). However since 2007’s St Andrew’s Agreement a complex but functioning 
consociational administration has governed Northern Ireland. The key tenets of 
consociational governance are: grand coalitions between the key groups are the norm; mutual 
veto is also typical so that a simple majority is never enough in decision making processes; 
and, proportionality is usual with representation based on population guaranteed in political 
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office, the civil service, the police etc., to ensure widespread confidence in emerging civic 
institutions (Lijphart 2008). 
 
Consociationalism has been advocated as a democratic arrangement which can help reconcile 
and rebuild societies fragmented along religious, racial, or linguistic lines, particularly those 
which have recently experienced violent conflict (Lijphart 2008). It has emerged as a political 
system in deeply divided societies such as those in Bosnia, Switzerland, India, Macedonia, 
Lebanon, Belgium and Northern Ireland (Lemarchand 2007; Rice et al., 2015). While studies 
of government communication in traditional majoritarian political systems expand rapidly 
there has been limited research into the communicative relationships of government 
communicators and the groups they interact with in post-conflict, deeply divided and 
constitutionally complex societies such as Northern Ireland. The present study addresses this 
research gap.  
 
 
Method 
A combination of purposive and snowball sampling techniques were employed to recruit 
individuals for semi-structured in-depth interviews who could provide data relevant to our 
research questions (Bryman, 2012; Tansey 2007). Our sample consisted of 9 senior GIOs 
(69% of the total), and 8 SpAds (42% of the total) and 16 political journalists, 33 
interviewees in total. All GIOs interviewed held the rank of Principal Information Officer in 
the civil service and, as with the SpAds who participated, worked across a number of 
different government departments for all five coalition government partners. The journalists 
who participated were from the main press and broadcast organizations in Northern Ireland, 
and all were at section editor or overall editor level. Interview questions focused on probing 
participants on their daily work routines of producing and disseminating information on 
government, and their interactions with the other participant groups. 
 
While our research focuses largely on GIO perspectives, our analysis and conclusions benefit 
from comparison with the thematic findings from all participants groups (Davis, 2009b). GIO 
responses are denoted by G1, G2, and so on; SpAd responses by S1, S2 and so on; and 
journalists responses by J1, J2 and so on. In our findings section below representative 
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quotations are italicised and have been edited (to remove repetitions, stutters and non-verbal 
sounds) for ease of understanding.  
 
Interviewing elites in divided societies is a complex endeavor (McEvoy, 2006) and where 
possible questions were framed in a manner which avoided inciting political sensitivities or 
identity issues. All interviews lasted around sixty minutes, were conducted in the participants’ 
workplaces, were audio recorded and later transcribed in full. Interviews were transcribed for 
analysis, which, in line with recommended interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA) 
procedures, was inductive in nature with themes emerging from the narratives (Clarke, 2009; 
Smith et al., 2009). This involved the process of “close reading” wherein a detailed reading and 
re-reading of the text is conducted (Alvesson and Skoldberg, 2009). The content was then 
coded to identify and delineate themes. The final thematic structure was agreed following 
detailed collaboration with the other author, who checked the transcripts to confirm themes and 
ensure that the selected quotes were reflective of the themes.  
 
Our analysis of interview transcripts employed IPA which gives primacy to the perceptions 
of respondents, since the objective is to generate knowledge in relation to their lived 
experience of a phenomenon (Langdridge, 2007). It is a framework which has become a 
widely employed qualitative analysis system (Walker & Burgess, 2011) and is an approach 
which is especially relevant for research which focuses upon personal meaning and sense-
making in relation to a specific context and with respondents who have similar experiences 
(Smith, Flowers, & Larkin, 2009). IPA involves, “a double hermeneutic because the 
researcher is trying to make sense of the participant trying to make sense of what is 
happening to them” (Smith et al. 2009 p. 3). Through adopting an approach of empathic 
hermeneutics, the researcher attempts to garner insight into the meanings being 
communicated by respondents. To move beyond the surface level of respondent accounts, a 
critical hermeneutic can then be utilized to interpret and make sense of their narratives (Smith 
et al. 2009). While accepting the individual meanings allocated to events by individuals, IPA 
enables various perspectives about similar events to be compared. By combining and 
interpreting narratives, common themes emerge which can inform our overall understanding 
of the phenomena under investigation. Two broad themes emerged from our interviews with 
GIOs, SpAds and journalists: changing communication roles and working relationships in 
the new post-conflict political space; and, the impact of the new devolved, consociational 
architecture upon the communication of politics in Northern Ireland.  We analyse these key 
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themes in the next two, strongly empirical, sections and then assess their significance in 
relation to building deliberative democracy in Northern Ireland’s developing public sphere.  
 
Government Information Officers: Changing roles and relationships 
When asked about how they perceive their role most GIOs typically emphasised a public 
service ideal: "we’re here to ensure that people on the ground understand what government’s 
doing...I enjoy working here because it’s serving the public” (G1). However when probed 
many also characterised the promotional aspect of their role, one noting: "the role is to 
promote the department and its minister and the work that they do …to get as much space for 
the good news and as little space for the bad news … part of our job is to promote, you know, 
that [the government] is working" (G4). Another emphasised this second point: “it’s part of 
our job to let it be seen that devolution’s working" (G3).  This idea that there are two key 
promotional tasks is interesting and is what separates GIOs from SpAds who see the 
promotion of their minister as where their responsibility begins and ends: "Everything that 
goes on around here, you know I am looking with one eye to, where does that leave 
the...minister’s profile, where does that fit in with a communication strategy that we will have 
rolling forward" (S6). When questioned about the role of the GIO, many journalists cast 
doubt on GIOs' claim to act in the ‘public interest’ and in fact generally characterise GIOs as 
concentrating instead on ministerial or departmental reputation management, one journalist 
said: "their outlook has become more like a corporation than a public service, you know it’s 
like they’re PR chiefs for Shell Oil, rather than there to provide for us journalists, as 
representatives of the public…a public service" (J15). Larsson (2002) in a study of local 
government in Sweden notes that journalists and political actors generally display a high 
level of trust towards each other. Journalists in our study accepted they depended on each 
other but usually emphasised that in their relationships with GIOs: ‘I don’t entirely trust him 
and he doesn’t entirely trust me’ (J3). The views of GIOs' in our study tended to mirror the 
mild antagonism that journalists expressed and indeed they frequently complained about the 
poor standards of journalists. When invited to comment on any positive features of their 
dealings with journalists they usually framed the relationship in terms of instrumentality and 
reciprocity. One GIO noted: “we need them to get our stories across…we need them to 
understand the issues and they need the hotline to us so that if they get a story at five to five, 
they want to go on the news at five, they can ring me and ask me X,Y,Z and I give them it” 
(G1).  
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Responses from both GIOs and SpAds build a picture of a gradual reduction in the 
communication activities of GIOs and increasing control and responsibility being taken by 
the SpAd. For some GIOs this was a rather suffocating experience: “now I’m speaking to him 
more than the wife, like you can’t breathe without [the SpAd], wanting to know what’s going 
on. So not only do you need to convince the minister, you need to convince the adviser” (G5). 
In respect to day-to-day media relations the same GIO stated: “every media enquiry we 
receive needs to go through the adviser…Nothing goes out without their approval”. Another 
noted: “Whatever he says goes, simple as that, I can’t over-rule him” (G3). Some SpAds 
acknowledged that their role often constrained by GIOs one noting in his government 
department the GIO: “may well say that fella tells me what to do, when to do it and how to do 
it” (S2). Another SpAd, reflecting on the shift in power, said: “I think they’re [GIOs] much 
more aware of the need to get out good messages than what was the case previously, they’re 
much more accountable obviously now…in the old system they didn’t have to work to 
advisers. That might be a sore point” (S6).  
 
Even though the UK’s Special Adviser Code of Conductii explicitly prohibits them from 
‘managing’ or ‘directing’ civil servants (Gay, 2010), it seems that many GIOs have come to 
accept that there is little they can do to challenge the power of SpAds. Indeed some have 
attempted to rationalize this new organizational reality, one GIO explained: “the Special 
Adviser will have the mind of the minister better than any other civil servant right. So, a 
Special Adviser can give the press officer like me really good advice and say they’ll run with 
that, he’ll not go with that” (G8). It is debateable whether this kind of interaction illustrates 
'advice', indeed arguably it fits rather well with Mumby’s (1988) analysis of how 
organizational power works. Mumby notes: “A particular group’s interests will be best served 
if those interests become part of the taken-for-granted social reality that structures 
organizational life. Once these interests become part of the organizational structure, then that 
structure simultaneously mediates in and reproduces those interests” (Mumby, 1988:67). 
Thus despite a strict Code of Conduct governing these relationships the all-pervasive 
influence of SpAds over communicative activities, by virtue of the associative power which 
they accrue from their minister (Fawcett and Gay, 2010), means GIOs reluctantly acquiesce 
to the new reality and/or justify it to themselves in the manner illustrated above.  
 
A number of GIO participants complained that SpAds sometimes liaised ‘off the record’ with 
journalists, providing exclusive or ‘better’ information to that of the GIO, for party political 
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gain even when this clashed with departmental priorities. According to GIOs, this means they 
appear as a less valuable source to journalists which undermines their position. This situation 
often causes GIOs to feel frustrated and powerless in their role. A GIO articulated a common 
complaint: 
“they would leak an awful lot of stuff that they shouldn’t really leak at all. So, it’s 
unhelpful when they do speak to journalists because I’m in one room trying to sell 
something and he’s in a room just over there  talking to the same journalist about 
something else, it makes us look…moronic…but they all do it…it’s just something 
we’re faced with” (G5).  
Some commentators suggest that 'leaking' has become a common means of disseminating 
information in democratic governments (Flynn, 2006). Indeed interviewees from all three 
participant groups in this study commented that leaking was a frequent way of disseminating 
information from the government because it avoided the protracted process of the agreed 
central government communication mechanism, the Executive Information System (EIS), 
which requires information to be politically neutral and often to have cross-
departmental/party agreement. It is of course a key way of communicating quickly to one’s 
advantage (which frequently involves undermining rival parties' positions) and belongs in the 
category which Gaber (2000) defines as ‘below the line’ spin. The GIO perception that 
SpAds are supplanting them as the primary departmental communicators is recognised by 
journalists who speak of SpAds as more productive sources than GIOs. Typical comments 
were: "when you’re speaking to the Special Adviser you know you’re speaking to the 
minister…they can be more helpful in sort of steering you...to stories … they’ll talk to you 
about what’s really going on” (J11). In this sense these findings diverge somewhat from 
research elsewhere, for example Gaber’s work on the UK Westminster system finds that: 
“Journalists speak with senior press officers on much the same basis as they speak with 
special advisers” (2004: 368). A journalist commenting on this situation noted that the 
Executive Information Service (EIS): “does the basic press releases and the road safety 
campaigns … all that sort of stuff,  but, the really big shouts, the really big decisions are 
invariably taken by the parties [i.e. the SpAd]” (J16). This results in SpAds and party press 
officers increasingly emerging as the preferred point of contact for the media. In this sense 
our results echo Meyer’s (1999) findings in his study of the European Union’s 
communication practices which found that a significant problem for that polity’s public 
communication and media relations was the lack of political cohesion and the inability for 
communicators to manage competing political agendas. 
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There seems to be a distinction emerging in government news management in Northern 
Ireland between important ‘political’ news and less important ‘government’ news and all of 
the actors in this communication environment recognise who is responsible for disseminating 
the different types of news. One way of thinking about this is to characterise it as SpAds 
controlling the ‘below the line’ (Gaber, 2000) communication and the important ‘good news’ 
stories, leaving GIOs to engage in the more mundane ‘above the line’ government 
communication. It does run the risk of producing a situation where the 'everyday' functioning 
of government is not actually 'news', with higher news value attached to controversial issues 
and political conflict, a situation hardly unique to Northern Ireland, but nevertheless clearly 
problematic for emerging democratic institutions and for the provision of the transparent 
policy information required for authentic deliberation (Flinders and Kelso, 2011; Wodak, 
2011). It can also perhaps be viewed as a reflection of the ‘mediatization’ of politics in 
Northern Ireland at least in the partial sense identified by Mazzoleni and Schulz (1999) who 
suggest that: ‘political institutions increasingly are dependent on and shaped by mass media 
but nevertheless remain in control of political processes and functions’ (Mazzoleni and 
Schulz, 1999:247). The concern with media representation by the parties which make up the 
coalition government is clearly the main reason why SpAds are constantly trying to exert 
their control over what they, and their ministerial boss, regard as the most important aspects 
of information and communication management. Several journalists commented on the 
increasing involvement SpAds have in all aspects of departmental communication and the 
decline of GIO control in this area. For some journalists this was all part of the deliberate 
attempts to undermine civil servants by the new political elites, one suggesting that GIOs: "at 
the highest level of the government are absolutely undermined...not empowered to tell us 
what’s going on, because they [ministers] use their own press officers to selectively leak to 
chosen journalists. Very unhealthy situation" (J14). While it is clear that organisational 
cultures “do not arise spontaneously and consensually, but are often the product of certain 
power distributions” (Mumby, 1988: 56), and that this is manifestly the case in Northern 
Ireland’s new political institutions, it is also arguable that difficulties in adapting their 
professional ideology has played a role in the GIOs' decline as key government sources. The 
fear of being charged with showing any kind of favouritism to one or other side of the 
political/cultural/religious divide, is in many ways as significant as the power SpAds hold 
over GIOs, when it comes to restricting their work as media sources. Many GIOs have 
interpreted this ‘impartial role’ to mean that they work within their departmental ‘silo’ 
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(Wilford, 2007) and focus on managing it (and the minister’s) reputation the best they can 
within the scope they are allowed by the SpAd. 
 
All this should however not obscure the fact that our research indicates that the first priority 
of the SpAd and consequently the government department’s communication efforts is how 
the minister will appear to best advantage in the media and just as importantly how to ensure 
this is to the detriment of rival ministers in the power sharing government. We will explore 
this further in the next section. 
 
The consociational political architecture and ‘government’ communication 
When asked about working in a power-sharing government administration made up of 
political parties who were fundamentally opposed to each other across a number of key 
issues, a typical GIO response was: “as a civil servant, I am not political and it doesn’t 
matter who my minister is, I’m impartial” (G1). Journalists we interviewed complained that 
GIOs tended to be ‘overly bureaucratic’ and were fond of citing the ‘strict guidelines’ under 
which they worked. For journalists this meant that GIOs were viewed as: “barriers to 
information flows instead of, helping them” (J7). GIOs claimed they had to adhere to political 
neutrality at all times, one noting: “it’s not worth your job to step over it at any point” (G9). 
They also frequently raised the point that their job was especially difficult in a five party 
mandatory coalition government and acknowledged that this may make it appear at times that 
they are a ‘closed’ civil service which does not interact enough with journalists. GIOs 
frequently brought up the dramatic changes that had occurred in governance and government 
communication since the establishment of a devolved legislature in Northern Ireland. One 
noted: 
“for many years people thought it was the civil service who ran the country and it 
probably was…because you know, we had direct rule [British government] ministers 
who literally were only here, maybe a couple of half days a week. So they were 
relying so much on civil servants to keep them right, that they didn’t give full scrutiny 
to things…there was an amazing difference, going from direct rule ministers, to 
locally elected ministers who were here, seven days a week, twenty four hours a day, 
reading the local papers, watching the local news” (G3). 
 
Many journalists also commented on the detrimental impact of Northern Ireland's new 
institutional structures on the power of GIOs: "one of the big differences that we’ve seen with 
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devolution, with local parties taking over and because of the nature of the government that 
we have, is that...this is a politically driven government, where as previously it was, a kind of 
administration that was largely driven by the civil service" (J7). As noted above, a result of 
this is that SpAds, with more ‘inside’ knowledge on political issues, are often journalists' 
preferred sources.  
 
In respect to the peculiarities which emerge in government administration within the 
consociational architecture bequeathed by the Good Friday Agreement, GIOs raised a number 
of issues which explicitly or implicitly relate to this structure. For example many expressed 
bemusement at the political infighting between Ministers who are supposed to be members of 
the same government: “Most of the criticism of government policy … has come from 
government ministers…it’s very odd…if you’re responding to criticism from a government 
minister you know you’re quite often hamstrung in what you can say” (G1). G1 further noted 
“there are arguments in every government, but in most governments they go on behind closed 
doors. In here, quite often, just because of the nature of it, it will happen in public”. This 
participant outlined how he coped with this situation: 
“You have to remember that the Government, it may not appear to be a unified body 
but...I operate as if it’s a unified body, the ministers may not, so it can be difficult in 
that regard...it used to be that we knew who the government was here and who the 
opposition was, the government was Direct Rule [British Government] and the 
opposition was the local parties. Now, the government is the opposition" (G1). 
 
Thus traditional ideas about collective government responsibility (including in coalition 
administrations) for policy decisions do not necessarily apply in Northern Ireland’s power-
sharing structure which includes parties across the political spectrum. Some GIOs pointed to 
how other devolved UK administrations have resolved the problem of coalition government 
while at the same time drawing attention to the limitations combining devolution with 
consociationalism had produced. One noted: 
“the Scottish government, have a central team that look after all the Scottish 
government. I don’t think that would work here...The politics isn’t right for that to 
work here…you could argue that you should have one central press office that looks 
after all government communications but…it is a cumbersome organisation, but the 
Assembly is cumbersome, so it’s probably a right fit for what it is” (G7) 
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SpAds also recognized the difficulties which GIOs encountered in presenting any sort of 
unified government communication. When questioned about the changes in government 
communication since the establishment of consociational government, one SpAd stated that 
that the new political institutions discourage collective government responsibility and 
encourage competition between ministers from rival parties. They also acknowledged that this 
can impact both on the autonomy of GIOs, and their ability to develop a common government 
information dissemination strategy. One SpAd observed: "the will of the ministers will always 
over-rule this central [government communication] mechanism, which means that you could in 
any one day have a situation where government could be making three or four very important 
announcements and they all clash...a lot of them [ministers] try and get the best piece of PR for 
themselves…rather than looking at the Executive as a whole" (S6). Another SpAd agreed: 
“you get this silo mentality where people are doing separate things… it is very difficult 
because it’s almost a replication of the political structure that sits above it…[GIOs] don’t at 
this stage have the power to be able to say to one minister or another no you can’t do it, simply 
because we’re built around a coalition government” (S4). 
  
Interestingly however, SpAds don’t seem to recognise the GIO view that the political 
opposition is actually inside the government, instead, and despite the fact that they are very 
concerned to court the media they also complain that the media frequently take on the role of 
political opposition “the press here, because there’s no formal opposition at Stormont 
probably take the view that, they effectively are the opposition… most of them are just 
generally hostile here” (S4). For their part, many journalists regard the current phase in the 
development of democratic politics in Northern Ireland as at best a necessary stage along the 
path to a more majoritarian political system.  One stated: “conventional politics is still in a 
very infant stage here and I would envisage it would change and mature and eventually we 
will have government and opposition, and that will be the biggest change and the best thing 
that can happen” (J11). GIOs expressed the concern that the negative media coverage in 
respect to politics and politicians was problematic for Northern Ireland’s nascent democracy. 
A typical view was: 
“the media, don’t seem to take their responsibility in a democratic society 
seriously…in order for a democracy to work people have to vote, and people have to 
vote for the people they think are going to represent them as best they can, so they 
might base that one decision every four years on something that they read, and if they 
read something that is over-sensationalized, unfair or untrue, that could be the 
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difference in that person voting for a different party, not placing their vote at all” 
(G2). 
 
Interestingly in their book on how journalism has developed in Northern Ireland since the 
peace process McLaughlin and Baker (2010) argue that journalists, on the whole, are not 
adhering to their responsibility to be critical enough of the political elites.  
 
It could be argued that underpinning the GIO complaint about the media is a restatement of 
the classic liberal democratic view that devising the right constitutional arrangements will 
allow open undistorted communication flows and result in rational deliberative democracy. 
As Dryzek notes: 
“Liberals are keen to devise constitutional and legal arrangements that will counteract 
distortion: bills of rights, freely-elected legislatures, and so forth… What liberals fail 
to recognise is that getting constitutions and laws right is only half the battle. They 
fail to recognise that extra-constitutional agents of distortion that can’t easily be 
counteracted through such means” (Dryzek, 2000, p. 21). 
 
In Northern Ireland these extra-constitutional agents include dominant discourses and 
ideologies intertwined with structural socio-cultural and ethnic identity forces. This is an 
issue which we will discuss in more detail below but it is worth noting that in consociational 
systems government communication is frequently tied to the balancing act that is a feature of 
decision making in this arrangement. As one journalist succinctly put it: “in our system of 
government, quite often decisions will be made not on the basis of policy but probably on the 
basis of a trade-off between the different power blocs…The job of the department is to try and 
justify what’s happened on the basis of policy” (J7). One other point should be noted in 
regard to communication management within Northern Ireland’s complex coalition 
government which is made up of political parties which are ideologically and politically (in 
respect to constitutional aspirations) opposed to each other. It may be that the consociational 
architecture in Northern Ireland has opened up a space for the Special Adviser role and reach 
which is more multifaceted than in other Westminster style polities. As one SpAd interviewee 
stated: "obviously in a five party coalition, when there’s cross-departmental issues, where 
there’s areas of controversy, where there’s blockages, special advisers are the people that are 
sent in to try and resolve those issues" (S4). It must be noted, however, that despite their 
eagerness to embrace this role, up to now SpAds have had little success in resolving the 
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major difficulties besetting the governing administration in Northern Ireland. Other studies of 
coalition government (Connaughton 2010; Fawcett and Gay 2010; Paun, 2011) have 
identified SpAds playing a highly effective communications role across coalitions 
governments. Eichbaum and Shaw note: “Clearly, in some jurisdictions, the constitutional 
context, and specifically a transition to multi-party Government, opens up institutional spaces 
that…political staff in particular, may be required to fill” (2010:199).  
 
Discussion and conclusion: Deliberative democracy in Northern Ireland?        
With the establishment of a devolved governing administration in Northern Ireland  – and this 
is true to an extent in the other devolved UK national regions (Scotland and Wales) - 
significant power has moved from civil servants, to locally elected ministers and their support 
network (Knox, 2010). One important effect of the devolution in Northern Ireland has been 
that the pre-devolution ‘dominant coalition’ (Berger, 2009) in respect to government 
communication, was overturned to the detriment of GIOs. In this respect it is important to 
recognise that Northern Ireland mirrors other more stable and ‘traditional’ (i.e. majoritarian) 
democratic societies where the increased power and influence of SpAds has been noted 
within political systems (Blick, 2004; King, 2003). Indeed our results most certainly also 
reflect broader changes in the UK political system which has resulted in the curtailing of civil 
servant autonomy and control over government communication shifting to ministerial SpAds 
(Winstone, 2003). However, it is also the case that the deeply divided post-conflict context 
and the relatively unique constitutional political architecture of Northern Ireland’s democratic 
institutions produce some significant findings which diverge from the work on government 
communication in ‘traditional’ polities. Northern Ireland has a decentralized governance 
structure which has rendered attempts to impose any notion of collective cabinet 
responsibility futile. One result is that there is no recognisable government communication 
strategy. Northern Ireland’s governing coalition is currently made up of what have been 
described as ‘ethnic tribune parties’ (Mitchell et al. 2009), who prioritise defending group 
identities, because it is in their electoral self-interest to maintain distinct identity blocs. A key 
impact of this consociationalism has been to turn government departments into de facto party 
‘fiefdoms’ (Wilford 2007) ruled by the minister and his/her SpAds. Hayward (2013) notes 
how the peace agreement and consociational political institutions in Northern Ireland actually 
did lead to new opportunities for democratic political confrontation and dialogue, but at the 
same time also consolidated identity cleavages and thus incentivised power politics. She 
argues:  
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‘although benefitting from the devolved, stable and carefully balanced governance 
made possible by consociationalism, Northern Ireland’s peace process is imbued with 
a sense of underlying lack of resolution. And as a result of this uncertainty, short-term 
political capital is gained within competing blocs at the expense of long-term social 
change in the common interest’ (Hayward 2013, p. 11).  
 
So while consociationalism does produce real political power-sharing, as Tonge (2014: 194) 
observes, the system: 'when unaccompanied by a longer-term plan for societal integration, does 
not offer the promise of movement towards reconciliation, instead leading to the restatement of 
difference’.  
 
There is increasing evidence that the institutionalized antagonism and confrontational 
communication culture has reduced public faith in political institutions. A recent Public 
Engagement Survey found that only 22% were ‘satisfied’ or 'fairly satisfied' with the 
Northern Ireland government and 49% felt they had ‘no influence’ on decision making in 
Northern Ireland, with 40% saying they had ‘very little influence’ (Ipsos MORI, 2010iii). A 
Northern Ireland Life and Times (NILT 2013)iv survey produced almost identical results 
revealing feelings of pessimism and powerlessness amongst many voters in respect to the 
influence that they have over decisions that affect them and this sense was particularly acute 
among young people and among those with no religious denomination. Yet, if measured in 
terms of voter turnout it would seem that public interest in politics remains relatively high in 
Northern Ireland compared to elsewhere in the UK and Europe (52% in the May 2014 
elections, compared to the EU average of 43% - see Hayward, 2013). However when the 
reasons for voting are probed more deeply it is clear that many electors cast their vote out of 
concern that the ‘other side’ may be elected. Hayward (2013) notes that all recent public 
surveys reveal Northern Ireland to be a society with generally low levels of perceived 
influence in decision-making at any level and a society in which those who are often 
identified as holding the key to a more peaceful future – younger people and those who are 
free from any one religious denomination – are the people who have the strongest feelings of 
alienation and pessimism. Galtung (1996), the central contemporary scholar of peace studies, 
makes an important distinction between ‘negative peace’ and ‘positive peace’. Negative 
peace refers to the absence of violence, for example, when a ceasefire is agreed. It is 
‘negative’ because something undesirable has stopped happening, violence has ceased, but 
this is not the same as positive peace. Positive peace, Galtung notes, involves the restoration 
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of relationships through forms of reconciliation, the creation of systems that serve the needs 
of the whole society and the resolution of conflict in a constructive way. Positive peace does 
not mean the absence of all conflict rather it means the absence of violence or the threat of 
violence as a means of engaging in conflict. A truly peaceful society exists where people 
manage their conflict positively, interact non-violently and respect the legitimate needs and 
interest of all. The main challenge for Northern Ireland’s political, media and civil society 
actors is how to move forward toward a more peaceful society and a more deliberative 
democracy where confrontation, debate and dialogue are all welcome in both public and 
empowered (legislative) communicative spaces, but coercion, deception and threat are absent.  
 
Research on government communication, Sanders argues, should be research: ‘that translates 
into policy recommendations about structures, resources, processes and outcomes, not driven 
by managerial imperatives but by normative concerns about the quality of civic life’ (2011: 
268). It is clear that developing the concept of democratic deliberation in contexts where 
political antagonisms have violently shattered the social fabric is a difficult task but it is a 
task which must be embraced if a more authentic, transparent and accountable democracy is 
to develop in Northern Ireland. Hayward (2013) argues that institutional reform is required 
that will allow for a truly deliberative overhaul of the country’s political life. This we suggest 
is partially true but equally important is reform of the communicative culture and key to this, 
is a transformation in the nature of the political rhetoric in Northern Ireland’s public sphere 
and political institutions. Dryzek (2010) distinguishes between bonding and bridgingv  
political rhetoric in societies where deep divisions exist. Bonding rhetoric is often deployed 
in ethnically divided democracies and has a tendency ‘to deepen divisions with outgroups … 
to move groups to extremes’ (Dryzek 2010: 238). In contrast Dryzek suggests: ‘bridging 
rhetoric takes seriously the outlooks of an intended audience that is different from the speaker 
– and from the kind of people or discourses the speaker represents' (2010: 328). In order to 
reach across deep societal divisions, Dryzek (2009: 1391) recommends: ‘interactive forums 
composed of individuals from different blocks, at a distance from contests about the 
construction of sovereign authority, concerned more with particular needs and concrete 
problems’. In Northern Ireland such forums do exist, indeed they were a requirement of the 
devolving of certain powers from the UK government level. Forums such as the District 
Policing Partnerships are required to have cross-community representation in order to agree 
decisions about local policing policy. They have been an important ground level forum for 
deliberation and participation where local representatives have been engaged in the hard work 
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of developing bridging rhetoric to reach across to audiences whose dispositions are different 
to their own in order to deliver successful community policing.  
 
Northern Ireland’s legislature, wherein much of the sovereign power resides, has a great deal 
to learn from such forums about the kind of communication required to foster a more 
deliberative democratic approach. Indeed it may be that the political elites are slowly learning 
such lessons. On 17 November 2015 the political parties came together to announce A Fresh 
Start – The Stormont Agreement and Implementation Plan: An agreement to consolidate the 
peace, secure stability, enable progress and offer hopevi. A key clause of the agreement 
noted: 
 “It is important that civic voices are heard and civic views are considered in relation 
to key social, cultural and economic issues. A new engagement model could be 
achieved, by June 2016, through the establishment of a compact civic advisory panel 
which would meet regularly to consider key social, cultural and economic issues and 
to advise the NI Executive.” 
 
This is an encouraging development and perhaps is the beginning of institutional changes 
which will broaden the deliberative democracy process in Northern Ireland. However, as our 
study has demonstrated, in common with all contemporary representative democracies, 
government communication in Northern Ireland: ‘passes through various expert 
communicators who package exchanges and discussions for audiences who have little 
opportunity to contribute’ (Bohman, 2012 p. 48). This is inescapable in representative mass 
democracy, but the question of what the responsibilities of these publically funded ‘expert 
communicators’ are to the public they serve is also inescapable. Political public relations does 
not necessarily have to foster the ‘mutual understanding’ and ‘two-way communication’ 
beloved of some PR models (see Cutlip et al, 2000 in the Introductory chapter to this book), 
but rather it should be committed to the ‘generalizable interest’, to fostering ‘genuine 
engagement’ and to the recognition that it is legitimate to hold partisan positions while at the 
same time recognising that opposing voices are treated ‘as adversaries rather than 
antagonists’ (Edwards, 2015; 13). In our study it is the GIO participants who speak most 
clearly of a strong sense of responsibility to inform citizens on government matters and even 
in facilitating a transition to a shared society. At this crucial stage in the development of its 
democratic institutions, it is imperative that both GIOs and SpAds build productive working 
relationships with each other (and with the media) in order to facilitate a post-conflict era of 
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transparent, accountable and participative politics in Northern Ireland. In our view this can 
only begin to be achieved if these relationships are built on strict adherence to the Civil 
Service Code and Northern Ireland’s Code of Conduct for Special Advisers (2015)vii, which 
prohibits SpAd interference in the work of GIOs. A commitment to build an authentic, 
deliberative and inclusive democracy in Northern Ireland, with bridging communication at 
the core, will enable the society to continue its path away from the violence and division of 
the ‘Troubles’.  
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